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Abstract
Central to any innovation process is the evaluation of proposed projects and allocation
of resources. We investigate whether novel research projects, those deviating from existing
research paradigms, are treated with a negative bias in expert evaluations. We analyze the
results of a peer review process for medical research grant proposals at a leading medical
research university, in which we recruited 142 expert university faculty members to evaluate 150
submissions, resulting in 2,130 randomly-assigned proposal-evaluator pair observations. Our
results conﬁrm a systematic penalty for novel proposals; a standard deviation increase in novelty
drops the expected rank of a proposal by 4.5 percentile points. This discounting is robust to
various controls for unobserved proposal quality and alternative explanations. Additional tests
suggest information eﬀects rather than strategic eﬀects account for the novelty penalty. Only
a minority of the novelty penalty could be related to perceptions of lesser feasibility of novel
proposals.
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paradigms, ﬁeld experiment.
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11 Introduction
Is there a bias against novel ideas and research hypotheses? As resources for scientiﬁc and technical
advance are scarce, society and organizations have developed a range of institutions to help select
the most meritorious ideas and to allocate resources to them for further development. Often project
evaluation cannot beneﬁt from objective measures, given the inherently uncertain nature of research
and innovation, and thus we depend on the subjective evaluation of experts (Stephan, 2012) who
use their existing knowledge base and experience to assess the merits of a research proposal. In the
academic science sphere, the approach most relied upon for enabling research agendas and providing
research funds is expert peer review. In this paper we investigate how nascent scientiﬁc hypotheses
are evaluated by designing a randomized expert peer review process. Speciﬁcally, we investigate a
longstanding hypothesis that novel research ideas outside currently accepted scientiﬁc paradigms
are susceptible to being discounted, rejected, or ignored (Kuhn, 1962; Fleck, 1935).
Expert peer review of new research proposals in academic science is now a large organized prac-
tice in its own right. In 2011 the combined budgets of the US federal civilian agencies dedicated
towards academic research in the sciences (National Institutes for Health (NIH) and National Sci-
ence Foundation (NSF)) exceeded $37.9 billion and was apportioned to roughly 40,000 research
applications through peer review. The cost of a faculty member reviewing grant applications for
the NIH was estimated at $1,700 per proposal (Stephan, 2012). Apart from the scale and consid-
erable eﬀort and investment of volunteer time, the process generates considerable overhead. For
example, the NSF in 2010 arranged for over 19,000 scientists to come to the Washington DC area
to participate in proposal evaluation. Moreover, expert evaluation of grants is highly consequential
to the direction and production of scientiﬁc ideas, also likely impacting promotion and labor mar-
ket outcomes (Chubin and Hackett, 1990). Chubin and Hackett (1990) ﬁnd that between 33% to
48% of scientists who face an initial rejection from funding sources in natural sciences in fact stop
working on the rejected line of inquiry subsequent to the rejection. The importance of expert peer
review in science and expert judgments on innovative projects more generally has accorded this area
considerable research attention, particularly in natural and life sciences (for reviews and surveys of
this work see: Marsh et al., 2008; Langfeldt, 2006; for recent studies, see: Li, 2012; Luukkonen,
2012).
In this paper we study expert peer review in the academic sciences. We focus on a hypothesis
articulated by Thomas Kuhn, in his now 50-year old book on “The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revo-
lutions” (1962). He conjectured that there is an inherent bias against novel ideas in science. The
prevailing scientiﬁc paradigm and its practitioners establish which questions are deemed interesting,
how they can legitimately be addressed, and what a solution should look like. This should tend
research towards incrementalism and “normal science”–and a corresponding disinclination to novel,
non-paradigmatic research paths. It follows there might plausibly be less novel research proposed
in the ﬁrst place. However, conditional on novel research indeed being proposed, it might also be
2the case that this research is penalized by gatekeepers conferring resources. This could be rooted in
any number of mechanisms. For example, there could be inherent informational challenges in eval-
uating new ideas on the basis of old ones, or possible evaluator conﬂicts of interest or other kinds of
strategic eﬀects. Inasmuch, as the existing paradigm was hard-won and now constitutes a working
path to continued progress, it is also plausible that deviations from the path could reasonably be
expected to be of lower productivity or at least higher risk, on average.
To empirically study whether expert evaluators indeed treat novel proposals diﬀerently–and
to provide insight as to why–we worked closely with the leadership team of a very large medical
school at a top tier research university to manipulate features of an internal grant proposal process
focused on an endocrine-related disease. Eﬀectively we “layered” a ﬁeld experiment within a normal
grant process, to allow us to derive relevant inferences beyond what observing a naturally-occurring
process would make possible. Our design began with recruiting a large number (142) of accomplished
medical researchers to act as evaluators, while at the same time taking steps to attract a relatively
large number of proposals (150) of varying novelty. We then randomly assigned multiple research
proposals to each reviewer and multiple evaluators to each research proposal, resulting in 2,130
proposal-evaluator pairs. Researchers’ and evaluators’ identities were blinded from one another,
and evaluators’ identities or involvement were also kept conﬁdential, resulting in a “triple-blinded”
evaluation process.
In our analysis we ﬁnd that evaluators uniformly and systematically give lower scores to propos-
als with increasing novelty; i.e. there is an economically signiﬁcant novelty discount. We measured
novelty in terms of the extent to which research proposals reﬂected unique combinations of de-
scriptive knowledge keywords (Medical Subject Headings or “MeSH terms”) that had not previously
appeared in the published medical sciences literature (consisting of over 22 million records). A num-
ber of alternative formulations of the novelty measure produce similar results. Our main challenge
in the analysis is to estimate the eﬀect of novelty, while assuring this estimate is not somehow bi-
ased by unobserved proposal characteristics and quality. We ﬁnd, on average, a standard deviation
increase in our measure of novelty resulted in a 4.5 percentile point drop in ranking or a 7-position
drop in rank order within our particular sample of 150 proposals. A combination of features of the
research design and diagnostics suggest the eﬀect cannot be explained by lower quality of novel pro-
posals; composition of evaluators; imperfect “blinding” of proposals and responses to the identities
of researchers rather than their content. Our analysis goes on to discern among several possible
underlying mechanisms causing the novelty penalty.
Therefore, we provide evidence in support of a longtime conjecture concerning incrementalism
in science. In particular, we present evidence that initial funding assessments can prematurely shut
down novel work by rewarding work within the existing map of science. Moreover, our ﬁndings
provide evidence that built into the institutions of scientiﬁc innovation is a novelty paradox, based
on what may be related to the fundamental limits of expert evaluation and peer review. We would
expect that exploring some degree of novel research paths should be productive in maintaining the
3advance of science and technology (Weitzman, 1998; Simonton, 1999; Fleming, 2001). Whatever
that optimal balance might be, it seems unlikely that the application of a relatively indiscriminate
and uniform novelty penalty should be an eﬀective means of attaining this balance.
2 Expert Evaluation in Science
One of the fundamental distinguishing features of academic research is the extensive and almost
exclusive use of peer evaluations in all stages of scientiﬁc work; from allocating resources to initiate
new lines of inquiry (grant reviews); to judging the quality and signiﬁcance of output (journal
reviews); and ultimately determining promotion outcomes (tenure proceedings) and community and
societal accolade (prizes for recognition of important work). Academic science as a self-governing
system uses peer evaluators as important gatekeepers that continually ensure that high standards
and quality are met; that good work is recognized and rewarded and poor quality is dismissed
(Zuckerman and Merton, 1971; Langfeldt, 2006). The degree of uncertainty related to the assessing
the quality of scientiﬁc work is, however, a function of the stage that is being assessed; with
considerably more ambiguity when embryonic scientiﬁc ideas are being judged for potential impact
as compared to making a tenure decision or giving an award.1 Chubin and Hackett (1990) ﬁnd
that between 33% to 48% of scientists who face an initial rejection from funding sources in natural
sciences in fact stop working on the rejected line of inquiry subsequent to the rejection. Hence,
peer-based grant evaluation is highly consequential to the direction and production of scientiﬁc
ideas, also likely impacting promotion and labor market outcomes (Chubin and Hackett, 1990).
2.1 Noise and Bias in Peer Evaluation
Peer evaluators assessing research proposals are faced with the considerable challenge of not being
able to directly observe the true quality of the research applications they are tasked with evaluating.
At best, expert peer evaluation generates an approximation of the true unobserved quality. Even
ex-post, the true ex-ante quality of an idea is vexingly diﬃcult to discern. For example, even if
accurate measurement were possible, the judgements of the evaluation process might themselves
inﬂuence later outcomes. Therefore, under the very best of circumstances, we might interpret
evaluator scoring as the true quality and some inevitable subjective error. In this best case, the error
is zero-mean and devoid of any unnecessary noise. Thus evaluation can be judged to be a problem
of simply aggregating or averaging the signals generated by evaluators in a way that minimizes
error. Indeed, the majority of NIH funding decisions are based on taking a simple average of the
score given by evaluators in study section committees that range in size from 25 to 50 members (Li,
1We limit our analysis of the existing literature to studies focused on grant evaluations. There is quite a substantial
literature on peer evaluation of journal manuscripts, however, this relates to scientiﬁc work already completely as
opposed to at a nascent proposal stage. See Ware (2011) for a comprehensive review of issues related to manuscript
review.
42012). Evidence from assessing national grant review systems has shown that inter-rater reliability
can be improved if more evaluators are added to the review team (Marsh et al., 2008). Extensions
to this principle of aggregation include weighting signals through review boards and through the
composition of those boards (Langfeldt, 2006; Mutz et al., 2012), and creating panel and group
processes that create opportunities for disclosing otherwise unshared information among evaluators
(Olbrecht and Bornmann, 2010).
The literature studying the eﬃcacy of grant peer review, largely begun in policy and natural
science journals in the 1970s, consists of a considerable number of testimonials, surveys and several
ﬁeld studies that introduce hypotheses concerning possible distortions in the peer review process
and data consistent with some of these hypotheses (see Langfeldt 2006 and Marsh et al. 2008
for reviews). Evidence suggests that noise and bias generated in the expert peer review process
may well exceed the above mentioned “best case” imperfect benchmark. For example, in their
seminal study of NSF grants, Cole et al. (1981) found that the variance among evaluators for a
given proposal was higher than the variance between proposals. Jaysinghe et al.’s (2003) analysis
of the Australian Research Council’s grant-making history of more than 2000 proposals and over
6000 evaluators showed that very few proposals were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the cutoﬀ value of
funding and thus the decision to fund or not was essentially driven by chance. Glaser et al. (2002)
argue this unnecessary noise and bias generates considerable Type I and Type II error, impacting
both poor quality proposals (positively) and truly meritorious proposals (negatively).
A ﬁrst set of issues documented in past research relates to how evaluators respond to the char-
acteristics of the submitting researcher. Most funding agencies employ a single-blind review process
where the identities of the proposal submitters are known to the evaluators but not vice versa;
many review protocols also ask for an assessment of the ability of the investigator to carry out the
proposed research; leading to a so called Mertononian (1968) “Matthew Eﬀect”.2 Characteristics
of the researcher (and particularly the relatedness of these characteristics to those of evaluators)
have also been found to correlate with scoring and evaluation outcomes, in dimensions such as
race, gender, education and aﬃliation (e.g., Bornmann et al. 2007; Marsh et al 2008; Reinhart
2009). In the context of single-blinded NIH committees, Li (2012) ﬁnds causal evidence showing
that relatedness between evaluators and researchers (in terms of cites made by reviewer to submit-
ting researchers) led to more positive evaluations. However, she also found that these more related
evaluators also provided appraisals that were more highly correlated to independent measures of
the research quality–indicating some informational beneﬁts, apart from any possible bias.
Beyond the characteristics of the submitter, past work has also pointed to how evaluators may
respond to characteristics of research proposals, themselves. For example, Kotchen et al (2004)
study of NIH grants between 1997 and 2002 shows that clinical research proposals are under-rated
2While not tested formally for grants, Ceci and Peters’ (1982) experiment in the area of journal peer review
showed that more than 90% of already accepted papers, having their attribution changed to lower prestige authors,
were rejected when sent back into the review process.
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to concerns about safety and privacy of human subjects. Peer evaluations may also be inﬂuenced
by “strategic eﬀects” such that the content of a proposal might either be too close to the work
conducted by the reviewer or the new work may diminish the importance of the evaluators’ own
work resulting in lower scores for the proposal (Horrobin 1990). On the other hand, experts may be
inclined to more positively evaluate research in their own ﬁeld to promote the importance of that
ﬁeld (Fang, 2011; Travis & Collins, 1991). More generally there may be a “tower of babel” issue
(Laudel 2006) amongst various schools of thought in scientiﬁc disciplines such that those belonging
to one stream of literature or another may fail to fully recognize or comprehend the precepts,
methods, or conclusions of those of other literatures (Carter, 1982; Wade, 1973; Travis and Collins,
1991).
2.2 The Treatment of Novelty
A range of scholars have converged on identifying that novel and unique combination of ideas and
technologies, more generally knowledge, in an evolutionarily recombinant search process is one of
the basic drivers of creativity, innovation, scientiﬁc discoveries and technical change (Basalla, 1988;
Weitzman, 1998; Simonton, 1999; Fleming, 2001; Sorenson and Fleming, 2004). Indeed Singh and
Fleming (2010, 43) note that “the idea that novelty is a unique combination is at least as old as
Adam Smith (1766).” Fleming (2001), makes important progress in using patent data to show
that novel recombinations of technological components tend to lead to lesser success, on average,
yet to greater variability and breakthrough innovations. However, rather than a simple question
of rationally “optimizing the innovation portfolio” of projects along novel and non-novel research
paths, it is a long held presumption that the institutional and educational structure of science leads
novelty to be systematically discounted, rejected, or ignored (Kuhn, 1962; Fleck, 1935).3 Evidence
on the discounting of interdisciplinary work is at least consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., Porter
and Rossini, 1985).
According to Kuhn (1962, 175), science proceeds incrementally within paradigms: “the entire
constellations of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given commu-
nity.” By Kuhn’s account, science has a tendency towards incremental advance within the estab-
lished paradigm, as it is this prevailing paradigm that establishes which scientiﬁc questions are
deemed interesting, how they can legitimately be addressed, and what a solution might look like.
It is further conjectured this tendency to incrementalism is suﬃciently strong that only through
“scientiﬁc revolutions” can established paradigms be overthrown–and only when contrary evidence
3Leaﬁng through research on evaluation from the natural science, one ﬁnds abundant presumptions of bias. Peer
evaluators working within the context of normal science are described by Carter (1982) as “so committed to their
paradigm that they cannot (or will not) see the value of unorthodox ideas” (Carter, 1982, 11). Hacking (p. xxvi),
in the preface to the 2012 edition of Kuhn’s book, asserts: “normal science does not aim at novelty but at clearing
up the status quo. It tends to discover what it expects to discover.” Horrobin (1990) provides a litany of anecdotes
that relate to the suppression of innovation in the medical sciences due to peer review.
6has accumulated or shows an inability to solve problems based on the prior theoretical apparatus
(Luukkonen, 2012).
We might simply expect that knowledge must necessarily accumulate as an accumulative stock-
pile of new ideas, resting on past ideas, experience and ﬁndings. It might therefore simply be an
inevitable feature of the accumulation of knowledge that advances are made easier, more predictable
and better understood when they continue from an existing body of well-established knowledge.
Where there is not a “surrounding” or “adjacent” body of theoretical and experimental results to
contextualize a proposal, we might expect there simply to be greater uncertainty. This might be
akin to a particularly pernicious form of the earlier mentioned “Tower of Babel” problem (Laudel,
2006); however, rather than a disconnect between two existing research approaches, it is a discon-
nection between established research and yet to be pursued research. The education, incentives
and attention of new generations of scientists, within the established paradigm, might exacerbate
such information eﬀects. For example, apart from focusing attention and eﬀort towards the existing
paradigm and normal science, this context of bounded cognition could also lead research to be
regarded as a potentially less legitimate “school of thought”, as above. Inasmuch as these diﬀerent
proposed research paths compete for resources and attention with existing research traditions, con-
ﬂicts of interest or strategic eﬀects could also plausibly shape evaluator decisions. More prosaically
than the above information or incentive eﬀects, novel research might also be prejudiced by mundane
features of proposal administration — such as a need to present past data or results and estab-
lished body of research—which might systematically prejudice evaluators against more novel work
(Langfeldt 2001, 2006; Stephan, 2012). Given likely very diﬀerent payoﬀs from pursuing novel re-
search, we might also expect that those that select themselves into novel, non-paradigmatic research
possess rather diﬀerent characteristics from those in the mainstream, perhaps creating additional
biases related to (non)relatedness of gatekeeping evaluators and those proposing the research.
3 Research Design & Context
The central goal of our empirical analysis is to test whether novel proposals are treated diﬀerently
by expert evaluators–and particularly whether the prediction of a systematic bias against novel
ideas is borne out in the data. We are particularly interested in how evaluators respond to research
proposals as such, rather than the identity of researchers (a separate issue beyond the scope of this
paper and given more attention in past research). In this section we describe our research design
to “evaluate the evaluators” in a grant allocation process. The design, summarized here, involves
several manipulations and alterations to a grant solicitation and evaluation process. Broadly, the
design is intended to allow us to draw relevant statistical inferences, while preserving key features
of a typical grant proposal setting.
The research setting involved our working closely with a research grant allocating body within
a leading medical research university to study results from the ﬁrst stage of a $1M grant process
7related to a major endocrine system disease. This disease category is a major economic and health
burden on society and it is the focus of signiﬁcant research eﬀorts at the host medical school
and related teaching hospitals. The university gives out internal grants to allow investigators to
bootstrap their research eﬀorts to generate preliminary data for NIH grant applications.
3.1 A Call for Research Proposals from the “First Phase” of a Grant
Process
The ideal sample of research proposals should allow us to observe meaningful variation in levels of
novelty, but at the same time be suﬃciently narrow and constrained so as to allow us to precisely
deﬁne and measure what it means to deviate from existing research pathways. Further, sampling
should be deﬁned in relation to something other than the literature itself, to avoid circular and tau-
tological deﬁnitions of what constitutes paradigmatic work. Thus, the design of the grant problem
was deﬁned in terms of a disease area (i.e., “nature” rather than existing human knowledge), and
avoided mention of existing literature or other constraints of the existing body of knowledge and
established research pathways. The problem was simply to make signiﬁcant progress in research
and treatment of the endocrine-system related disease.
While problem deﬁnition allowed for the possibility of observing a range of novel and paradig-
matic research proposals, it did not itself guarantee large numbers, or variation in the nature of
submissions. We implemented several alterations of the process with this in mind. For example,
to encourage submissions, the university president was enlisted to communicate via email an open
call to all members of the medical school and the broader university community. Rather than take
actions to attempt to promote variation in (high and low) novelty, as such, we found it practically
simpler to encourage new projects and “out of the box” proposals. We did so on the expectation
that within-paradigm normal science proposals would be attracted in any case, and the greater
challenge would be in attracting novelty.4
A more profound research design choice taken to encourage participation and variation was to
partition the grant proposal process into two distinct phases. A ﬁrst phase involved a solicitation
of proposals for approaches and ideas related to a wide range of possible avenues and research
pathways for making progress on the disease–from diagnosis, to treatment, to prophylaxis. This
ﬁrst phase—essentially a call for research hypotheses—is most relevant to the goals of this paper.
Separating the two phases accomplished several goals, including allowing us to focus on the most
relevant unit of analysis in the ﬁrst phase: the idea and hypothesis and proposed research pathway.
Partitioning the ﬁrst phase also reduced “entry costs” for prospective submitters, as documenting
4An implication of taking this approach of emphasizing novelty is that the evaluators observing these messages
will have eﬀectively been primed to understand that a goal of this exercise is to seek novel research ideas. However,
our design is not sensitive to oversampling on any one type of proposal–only that there be meaningful variation.
Further, it is not clear that the colloquial usage of “novelty” should necessarily be interpreted as our precise usage
of non-paradigmatic research.
8the basic research idea required a much shorter proposal than a full-length proposal. The average
proposal in this exercise was just several pages. The shorter research proposal also avoided the
problem of having the submission process have requirements that might on their own prejudice
against novel submissions (Langfeldt, 2001, 2006).
Important to note, partitioning the process should have also altered the precise structure of
incentives for participating in the grant process and, particularly, the ﬁrst phase. The ﬁrst phase
involved several explicit and implicit payoﬀs. Rather than a direct share of the $1M research funds
to be disbursed in the second phase, 12 winners were each awarded $2,500 cash prizes. Perhaps more
important, the invitation to the ﬁrst phase noted that the winning an award would also mean that
the second stage call for proposals would directly include calls for research in areas of the winning
research hypotheses, thus increasing the odds of winning a substantial grant in the second phase.
(Indeed 4 of the 12 ﬁrst stage winners went on to win second stage research grants.) Importantly,
the ﬁrst phase of the process also served as a platform for high-proﬁle exposure among peers and
university leaders. Awards were conferred by the dean of the medical school in a public formal
ceremony, attended by colleagues and members of the media and press. Therefore, while there is
necessarily some tradeoﬀ in gaining the beneﬁts of partitioning while altering incentives, at least the
categorical structure of incentives continues to appeal to typical incentives to attain “gold, ribbons,
and puzzles” (i.e., ﬁnancial rewards, reputation and acclaim and intrinsically motivating work),
the usual incentives of scientiﬁc researchers (Stephan, 2012). In total, the process generated 150
research proposals. Of the research proposals, 72 of them came from researchers within the host
university. The remaining 78 came from external researchers outside of the host university.
3.2 Recruiting Expert Evaluators
We recruited 142 evaluators to participate in this exercise. The typical practice of selecting expert
evaluators regularly used by major funding agencies is to choose those with specialized knowledge,
closely-related to that contained in the research proposal (Langfeldt, 2006). For example, in the
case of an ad hoc referee team, this might typically include a small handful of specialized researchers
whose phenomenological interest, research methods and/or questions relate to the research proposal
(Jayasinghe et al., 2003)–perhaps ﬁve or seven evaluators (Langfeldt, 2006). In larger evaluation
processes, as in the work of the NIH and NSF, meant to attend to larger ﬂow of proposals, standing
committees and subcommittees might reasonably form around topic area themes, with proposals
directed to most appropriate subcommittees (Li, 2012). Such larger committees can grow as large
as 30 or 50 researchers (Li, 2012).
To assure a large number and variety of evaluators while maintaining a representative group of
“leading” researchers who might potentially represent typical “gatekeepers”, we separately recruited
from three distinct groups: i) those with at least one publication in the same endocrine disease;
ii) those without publications in the disorder, but with at least one coauthored publication on a
9separate topic with someone who had published in the disorder; and iii) those without any direct or
ﬁrst-degree link to disease-speciﬁc publications. We recruited evaluators from the host university’s
roster of faculty. This allowed us to observe relatively detailed characteristics of each evaluator,
using the university’s systematized data collection on researcher careers. Drawing on faculty from
the host university also assured reasonably high-caliber participants, independent of rank. Strong
institutional support and commitment also helped minimize drop out of recruited evaluators. Our
approach to identifying evaluators was simply to rank order faculty at the medical school in each
of these three groups according to publications, inviting the top-ranked individuals. The pool is
obviously non-random and therefore our analysis relies on the observable variation of evaluators,
rather than on any claims of randomness or representativeness of this group in relation to the typical
teams that are formed above. Both the number and variety of evaluators comprised by our group
should exceed typical levels. The composition of evaluators is described in Table 1.
<Table 1>
As can be seen in Table 1, evaluators are relatively balanced in numbers across the three groups.
The proportions are also relatively evenly balanced across senior and junior faculty, with roughly
half being senior (associate or full) professors for each group. Each group also includes considerable
diversity in gender, age and training (in terms of M.D. or Ph.D.). Each group uniformly includes
(very) highly accomplished researchers, with an average publication count of 101. (While submitters
are themselves accomplished, they are clearly much more junior, on average, with roughly a tenth
of the number of publications as these most accomplished researcher leaders.) Variation in mean
levels of publication across each group is diﬃcult to interpret, given we should expect that numbers
of publications should diﬀer across diﬀerent ﬁelds. However, the counts remain high in each case.
3.3 Randomized Assignment Procedure
A total of 15 randomly selected research proposal submissions (among the 150 total) were assigned
to each of the 142 evaluators. Equivalently, an average of 14.2 randomly-selected faculty evaluated
each proposal. Practical considerations of having medical school personnel prepare and distribute
copies of proposals, while reliably corresponding with, supporting and recording evaluations led to an
additional simpliﬁcation/constraint in these random assignments. Rather than perfectly randomize
in an unconstrained fashion we instead created 10 “blocks”, which contained 15 randomly selected
proposals to which evaluators were then randomly assigned. Therefore, each research proposal
within a given block was evaluated by the same evaluators. Thus, the data should be considered
“block randomized.” This should not introduce any systematic error, but creates potential correlated
error within each evaluator block.
103.4 The Evaluation Process
Following convention in medical research grant proposal evaluations, the task of evaluators was to
score proposals using a 10-point scale to summarize their estimated assessment of the potential
impact of the ideas, hypotheses, and research pathways contained in each of the 15 proposals they
evaluated.5 The score was to respond to the question, “On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 Lowest - 10 Highest)
please assess the impact on (the disease) care, patients, or science of research.” We also devised
a secondary measure for validating the measure as indicative of perceived quality. This secondary
question asked the evaluator to assign a total of 100 points across proposals in terms of his or her
perception of merit in the proposals. Given our interest in novel research proposals in particular,
we also chose to include a similar question to evaluate perceptions of the feasibility of proposals
with an analogous 10-point scale.
Given our interest in having evaluators respond to the content of proposals (and particularly their
novelty) rather than to the submitting researchers’ identities, we designed the process with the aim
of minimizing the probability that identities would be found out. Submitters names were blinded
on proposals. The identity of evaluators was also blinded. Further, each evaluator performed his
or her evaluation independently, was not prompted to interact with other evaluators, nor were they
given the names of other evaluators, and had access only to the 15 proposals they were assigned.
Thus, evaluators were eﬀectively blinded from one another–and the overall evaluation process can be
regarded as “triple blinded”. The novel format, the call for new research and the wide participation
might have also served to increase the likelihood of anonymizing identities.
4 Data & Variables
With 142 evaluators and 15 evaluations per reviewer, our data set contains 2,130 proposal-evaluation
pair observations, with proposals and evaluators randomly assigned to one another. Several data
sources were brought together for the analysis. These include: each of the evaluator score sheets,
the database of prior academic publications and citations of submitting researchers (of the subset
coming from the host university) and detailed backgrounds and c.v.’s of all evaluators. Here we
review the deﬁnition and construction of our main variables.
The main dependent variable in our study is the main score out of ten given by evaluators
(Section 3.1) as an overall assessment of the potential impact of a research proposal (Score). We
also use the secondary dimensions that evaluators judged in their assessments, including the points
allocation and feasibility (Section 3.1). These and other main variables and other variables used in
the analysis are deﬁned and basic descriptive statistics provided in the following tables. These are
divided in terms of whether they vary with the proposal, the researcher (beyond the proposal), the
evaluator, or the proposal-evaluator pair.
5Funding decisions at the NIH are based on a 9-point “impact/priority” scale (1-exceptional - 9-poor);
http://enhancing-peer-review.nih.gov/scoring&reviewchanges.html
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4.1 The Key Construct: Novelty of a Research Proposal
In our study, novelty is intended to reﬂect the extent to which a proposed research pathway departs
from established science. In developing a measure of novelty, we exploit the controlled lexicon of
keywords customarily used to describe and categorize the content of research and research proposals
in the life sciences. These are referred to as “Medical Subject Heading” (MeSH) terms. Contrary
to many other academic ﬁelds, MeSH keywords are not assigned by authors. Rather, they are
assigned by professional science librarians, trained speciﬁcally to perform this task. The use of this
controlled vocabulary is intended to assure a global and consistent assignment of keywords across
the life science research community (Coletti and Bleich, 2001). We hired a professional librarian
trained in standardized procedures for evaluating the content of research according to guidelines
used by National Library of Medicine (NLM) at the NIH to code each of the proposals. On average,
proposals in our sample had 12.42 MeSH terms (std. dev. = 5.42).
Our main measure of novelty compares the MeSH term combination of a proposal with those
in the existing published literature. To generate a measure of whether and the extent to which a
proposal departs from the existing literature, we examine each of the possible pairs of MeSH terms
(i.e., for N terms there would be N(N   1)=2 pairs). We determine what fraction of these pairs
have not yet appeared in the existing literature. We refer to the entirety of publications listed in
the PubMed database (currently about 22 million articles), as representing the published literature.
Therefore, our measure Novelty can vary from zero to one. In our data it varies from 0 to .47. While
a small share of our observations, about a tenth, have zero novelty, the bulk of the observations vary
in the degree to which they depart from the existing literature, without being utterly disconnected.
While the use of a standardized and ﬁxed lexicon is what makes this comparison possible,
one potential limitation is that we will not observe deviations and departures that go beyond the
controlled lexicon. Thus, we may miss additional sources or types of novelty. To the extent there are
forms of novelty that involve utter new categories of innovation, rather than novel recombinations,
our measure will undercount novelty. More importantly, the eﬀect of novelty we estimate will be
downward (upward) biased to the extent that any unobserved novelty is positively (negatively)
correlated with recombinant novelty. In its face, we speculate it to be unlikely that utterly novel
ideas and recombinant novelty should necessarily be strongly negatively correlated. We also rely
here on claims that recombinant novelty should be an important source of truly novel advances
(Weitzman, 1998; Fleming, 2001). The hierarchical nature of MeSH terms also provides some
assurance that all novel advances are covered by higher-levels of categorization within the MeSH
hierarchy, if not lower levels.
Another possible limitation of the Novelty measure is that it exploits the entire existing litera-
ture, when the state of the ﬁeld might be better described by just recent years of work. However,
12we found almost no diﬀerence in our results when using the entire literature as a benchmark versus
using just the last 10 years of the PubMed record. This might possibly be explained by there simply
being a large weight of papers published in recent years, or perhaps relate to the cumulativeness of
science in medical research whereby more dated ﬁndings and research pathways remain relevant, or
at least informative.
More generally, it should also be noted that there may be any number of ways of algebraically
constructing a statistic that captures how a proposal’s MeSH term vector maps onto a vector
describing the content of the existing literature. For example, we have focused on new-to-the-world
two-way (pair) combinations of MeSH terms; we might have considered diﬀerent “dimensionality”
of the combinations we compared. However, one-way (singlet) combinations are ruled out because
they are each present in the published literature and three-way (triplet) and four-way (quadruplet)
combinations do not result in qualitative diﬀerences in results. Another plausible dimension in
which we might reconsider the construction of Novelty is that our measurement of the existing
literature discriminates between whether a MeSH pair has previously occurred or not, rather than
its frequency or popularity. But on conceptual grounds, it is more salient here to consider prior
existence rather than frequency of use.
A number of other considerations led us to perform additional tests (to follow, in the analysis).
For example, we considered whether we might somehow privilege those combinations that are novel
to the disease area, rather than novel to the broader literature. This question is potentially some-
what more interesting and less straightforward than earlier considerations. However, rather than
artiﬁcially constraining our deﬁnition of novelty, we maintain the strict deﬁnition (of novel to the
existing body of human knowledge, as a whole). Instead, within the analysis we more directly deal
with the question of how individuals from diﬀerent parts of the literature behave by accounting for
their “intellectual distance” from a proposal. We might also expect there to be qualitative diﬀer-
ences between something that has zero novelty (unambiguously within-paradigm) versus something
that departs, at all; or the “degree” or level of novelty might also play a role. We test for these
discrete and possible non-linear eﬀects in our analysis.
At a more mechanical level, a characteristic of the Novelty measure that needs to be acknowl-
edged is that it is constructed on the basis of unique pairwise combinations of MeSH terms–and
therefore is closely tied to the count of MeSH terms involved. As the simple count of MeSH terms
might itself be related to the scoring and evaluation of proposals, we explicitly control for this count
in our analysis.
135 Estimation Approach
5.1 A General Baseline Empirical Framework
The central goal of the empirical analysis is to answer the question of whether novel research pro-
posals are treated diﬀerently by evaluators — and following Kuhn’s hypothesis, whether novelty is
systematically discounted. To illustrate how this might be done, we ﬁrst summarize potential fac-
tors inﬂuencing evaluator scores in a general framework, including: characteristics of the evaluator
(indexed by e); characteristics of the proposal itself (indexed by p), including Novelty; and charac-
teristics of the researcher submitting the proposal (indexed by r). Scores might also be inﬂuenced
by relatedness of evaluator attributes with either those of the proposal or researcher. (See Section
2). We denote variables describing the link between evaluators and these factors with subscripts of
e   p and e   r. Beyond these categories of factors, we also allow for some zero-mean error term, .
Thus, our general framework for comprehending problems of statistical inference is as follows:
Scoreep = f(Xe;Noveltyp;Xp;Xr;Xe p;Xe r) + ep (1)
The advantage of this general framework is that it does not (nor does it need to) speciﬁcally
identify and discriminate among the many complex factors that could inﬂuence actual and perceived
merits of research proposals. Rather, the framework accounts for them all, while allowing us to
recognize the challenges of isolating and measuring the eﬀect of Novelty.
5.2 Linear Regression Model Implementation
Evaluator Characteristics. To account for evaluator characteristics in our model’s implemen-
tation, we exploit the assignment of multiple proposals to each evaluator by including individual
evaluator dummy variables (e), as in expression (2). In principle, introducing these controls should
not alter estimates of the eﬀect of novelty, as the random assignment procedure should have elimi-
nated any correlation between these characteristics and Novelty. They should nonetheless increase
precision of the model estimates. These controls are also appealing in that they allow us to refer
to an intuitive interpretation of the novelty eﬀects, in terms of how individual evaluators diﬀer in
their evaluation across proposals (rather than broader comparisons across evaluators and proposals,
at once). With this unambiguous and intuitive interpretation, we can then turn our analysis to
assessing why this is so.
Researcher Characteristics. The question of researcher characteristics is an altogether diﬀerent
kind of question. If our design has been successful, the combination of a “triple-blind” process (Sec-
tion 3.1), the call for new and potentially less-known research, wide participation, and unorthodox
proposal format should have obscured researcher identities. If successful, then cov (Scoreep;Xr) = 0
and cov (Scoreep;Xe r) = 0, and all researcher-related terms should drop out of the model, as in
14expression (2). (Note, we later re-introduce researcher-related terms as predictors of proposal qual-
ity, rather than as direct determinants of the score–an important distinction.) Apart from relying
on the design to assure these factors do not play a role, we perform explicit diagnostic tests as part
of robustness checks.
Research Proposal Characteristics. Accounting for research proposal characteristics–other
than novelty–is the single greatest estimation challenge in our analysis. To appreciate this point,
consider that the ideal experiment is to compare research proposals that are identical in every way,
except for their novelty. In such a setup, simply comparing matched pairs of this kind would allow us
to infer any novelty eﬀect. Of course, the characteristic of novelty should not be entirely separable
or uncorrelated with other characteristics of a research proposal. Our basic econometric challenge
is then to assure that our estimated eﬀect of novelty does not somehow reﬂect characteristics and
quality of proposals that i) aﬀect score; ii) are correlated with Novelty; and iii) are not themselves
a direct cause or consequence of novelty.6 Failing to account for such characteristics and quality has
the potential to generate omitted variable bias. Adding complication, diﬀerences in characteristics
and quality across proposals are not readily observable.
Unfortunately, it is inherently not possible to exploit randomized assignment or other features
of experimental design to overcome this fundamental estimation challenge. For example, includ-
ing proposal dummy variables would simply lead Novelty to drop out of the model altogether.
Another approach might be to simply introduce a selection of research proposal covariates as con-
trols; however, no number of “control” variables can wholly and assuredly account for unobserved
characteristics and remove any doubt of omitted variable bias.
Our main empirical strategy for dealing with these issues is practically similar to that of in-
troducing control variables, but with important diﬀerences in its aims and in which variables we
select to add to the model. Here, our approach is to address possible omitted variable bias by in-
troducing regressors that should serve as powerful independent predictors of (unobserved) proposal
characteristics and quality. Rather than have the goal of wholly controlling for these unobserved
characteristics, our goal is to observe how or whether accounting for unobserved characteristics and
quality lead the estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty to change, if at all. As predictors of proposal
characteristics and quality, we mainly rely on measures of the quality of the researchers themselves.
In particular we exploit researcher’s publication records (with data drawn from outside the experi-
ment). The intuition here is that a “high quality” researcher should be systematically more likely to
produce a “high quality” proposal, deserving of a high score.7 If unobserved proposal characteristics
and quality are correlated with both the scoring and with Novelty, introducing these predictors
6Controlling for direct causes or consequences of novelty would only serve to “soak up” any estimated novelty
eﬀect, rather than help us properly estimate and calibrate the eﬀect. Analysis of possible causes and consequences
of novelty eﬀect is left for subsequent analysis where we attempt to interpret the novelty eﬀect.
7As a reminder, our ability to exploit this approach depends crucially on successful blinding of researchers’
identities.
15should alter the estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty.
To provide still greater assurance of this approach, we include still more predictors including
those related to the proposal itself. The challenge here is to select predictors that might somehow be
reasonably expected to predict unobserved proposal characteristics and quality, but which should
not relate to novelty, nor its causes or consequences. Here, we elect to use the word count from
each proposal. These might roughly capture, for example, the level of eﬀort that was put into a
proposal.
Based on these above considerations, our linear implementation of the generalized framework
can be summarized as follows:
Scoreep = e + Noveltyp;+pQualityp + e pXe p + ep (2)
where Quality should be understood as a series of proxies for the true and unobserved charac-
teristics and quality of a proposal with bearing on the score, independent of its novelty. The term ep
is a zero-mean error term, redeﬁned from that in expression (1) to reﬂect the linear approximation
in this model. We estimate the model as ordinary least squares (OLS). Given possible idiosyncratic
errors across evaluator groups, evaluators and research proposals, we use bootstrapped standard
errors.
In our main estimates, geared to estimating the direct eﬀect of novelty on evaluations, we do
not investigate relationships between evaluator characteristics and proposal characteristics (i.e.,
e pXe p). (In not explicitly controlling for these characteristics in the initial calibration of eﬀects
we are exploiting the randomized assignment of evaluators to assure this term is not correlated with
our error term.) The explicit use of these terms becomes more relevant in our follow-on investigation
into the causes and explanations of novelty eﬀects.
6 Analysis & Results
6.1 Main Results
This section implements the model described in expression (2). Our ﬁrst OLS results are reported
in Table 4. Model (1) regresses Score on Novelty and a constant term. We also control for the
simple count of MeSH terms, to assure our estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty is not simply indirectly
picking up the eﬀects of this term (Section 4.1). We ﬁnd the coeﬃcient on Novelty is statistically
signiﬁcant and negative (-2.38), consistent with a novelty discount. Subsequent estimates will not
substantially diﬀer from this ﬁrst and simplest estimate. The coeﬃcient on the MeSH term count is
itself positive and signiﬁcant and alters the coeﬃcient on Novelty from what it would have otherwise
been (-1.53 signiﬁcant at p < 1%). Introducing a more ﬂexible series of dummies corresponding to
diﬀerent counts of MeSH terms does not alter our coeﬃcient on Novelty, as in model (3); nor does
introducing dummies for individual types of MeSH terms alter the results. Therefore, we simply
16maintain the linear control for MeSH term count in subsequent models.
<Table 4>
We proceed to control for diﬀerences across evaluators. We begin by introducing dummy vari-
ables for each of the 10 blocks of evaluators (recall random assignment was implemented through
block randomization, as described in Section 3.4). As reported in model (4), this does not aﬀect the
estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty, and contributes little explanatory power (comparing the adjusted-
R2 statistic in model (4) with that of model (1)). Therefore, our use of block randomization rather
than simple randomization has no impact on results. Also consistent with eﬀective randomization,
neither does adding individual evaluator dummies aﬀect model coeﬃcients, as reported in model
(5). Evaluator diﬀerences do, however, account for a large share of variation; the adjusted-R2 in-
creases from .03 in model (1) to .22 in model (5). We retain evaluator dummy variables as part of
our preferred speciﬁcation given this considerable explanatory power, and in order to allow us to
then interpret the coeﬃcient on Novelty, as literally representing how individual evaluators treat
more novel proposals diﬀerently (i.e., comparing responses across proposals and within evaluators,
rather than across evaluators).
To fully implement the model described in expression (2), we turn to accounting for unobserved
research proposal characteristics and quality (Section 5.2). Here, we exploit data which are only
available for the 689 proposal-evaluator pairs related to submissions coming from the host univer-
sity. We report results on this subsample in Table 5. We begin by re-regressing the earlier model
(5) from Table 4 on this subsample to conﬁrm similar results, as reported in model (1) of Table
5. The estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty for this subsample, -3.37, is similar to the earlier estimate.
(The coeﬃcient estimated on just the excluded data is itself signiﬁcant and negative.) In regressions
performed here, our goal is to introduce variables that serve as predictors of the unobserved charac-
teristics and quality of research proposals, apart from novelty (Section 5.2). Model (2), for example,
introduces the number of publications the submitting researcher has in the endocrine-related dis-
ease area. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient clearly indicates this count serves as a meaningful
predictor of proposal quality and scoring, despite coming from outside the experiment. More crucial
to our analysis, introducing this predictor has no signiﬁcant impact on the coeﬃcient estimated on
Novelty. Model (3) alternatively introduces the total citation count in these publications and ﬁnds
similar results. There is no such positive relationship between score and either overall publications
or overall citations, as in models (4) and (5), and just the sign on total publications is signiﬁcant.
These coeﬃcients are also diﬃcult to interpret, as they may reﬂect not only the general success of a
researcher but also diﬀerences across ﬁelds. Nonetheless the signiﬁcance, at least on publications in
model (4), suggests it is somehow predictive of scores. Most importantly, the coeﬃcient on Novelty
is again unchanged.
<Table 5>
17In model (6), we go further by including each of these four measures of publications and citations
at once, along with 23 other statistics making a “long list” of 27 predictors.8 Remarkably, the point
estimate and signiﬁcant of the estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty still does not change. This is espe-
cially of note given that including this long list of predictors of unobserved proposal characteristics
leads the adjusted-R2 statistic to jump from .3 to .4. Therefore, this bundle of predictors does seem
to be oﬀering substantial predictive power for unobserved proposal characteristics. In model (7)
we add still another variable, the word count of proposals. This, too, does not signiﬁcantly change
the estimate. Therefore, we see overwhelmingly stable estimates of the coeﬃcient on Novelty de-
spite introducing these meaningful predictors of unobserved proposal characteristics and quality.
Therefore, subject to further robustness checks, it appears we may return to the complete data set
without these additional controls.
6.2 Robustness
Unobserved Proposal Characteristics, i.e., cov (Noveltyp; ep) = 0. Our most important con-
cern overall in estimating the coeﬃcient on Novelty, the point just dealt with above, is that novelty
may be correlated with unobserved proposal quality and characteristics that aﬀect scoring. Per-
haps a ﬁrst and most important assurance is that including a barrage of predictors for unobserved
proposal characteristics, as in the preceding section and in Table 5, did not aﬀect the estimated
coeﬃcient on Novelty. This is an immensely convenient feature of the structure of the data and
underlying mechanisms that we could not have predicted in the initial design of this study.
A second source of assurance is the extent to which the variables intended to capture unobserved
proposal characteristic appear to explain a large share of the variation that is potentially attributable
to unobserved proposal diﬀerences. Whereas regressing a model with only evaluator dummies
produces an R2 statistic of .40, adding Novelty and the “long list” of predictors of unobserved
proposal quality leads the R2 statistic to increase to .55. (adjusted-R2 statistic = .40). Importantly,
we can compare this to the total amount of variation that might potentially be explained in the best
of cases by comparing this R2 to what we get when regressing the score on both evaluator dummies
and research proposal dummies at once. In this case, the R2 statistic is .61. Therefore, our “long
list” of predictors of unobservable proposal characteristics and quality can be understood to explain
a remarkable 71% of all possible variation that might be explained by cross-sectional proposal
8Controls include: counts of endocrine publications; counts of endocrine publication citations; counts of total
publications; counts of total publication citations; re-counts of the earlier four measures, based on just the past 3, 5,
and 7 years; counts of publications divided by author position (ﬁrst author, second author, last author, second last
author, other position); counts of publications with MeSH terms as in the research proposal; counts of publication
citations with MeSH terms as in the research proposal; counts of publications with MeSH terms as in the research
proposal; counts of publication citations with MeSH terms as in the research proposal; counts “hit” publications
based on achieving top citation percentiles within year of publication (including separate measures for 99th, 95th,
90th and 75th percentiles); counts of citations for most cited paper in endocrine publications; counts of citations
for most cited paper in total publications; counts of citations for most cited paper in publications with at least one
MeSH term as the research proposal.
18diﬀerences (or (:55   :40)=(:61   :40)). Therefore, we have explained a large share, a majority of
unobserved variation with our predictor strategy and have found this variation is orthogonal to
variation in novelty.
A third source of assurance relates to implementing research proposal dummies. Of course, using
these dummies leads Novelty or any other proposal covariate to drop out of the model. However,
we can at least test to see whether the model remains stable for characteristics of proposal-evaluator
pairs (that do not drop out) when adding both proposal and evaluator dummies, as shown in Table
6. Here we use a measure of the intellectual Distance between evaluators and research proposal.
(Relationships with this measure are studied substantively in Section 6.4; here we simply use the
measure instrumentally to test model robustness.) Model (1) ﬁrst re-regresses our baseline model
with the entire data set (i.e., model (5) of Table 4) while adding our measure of Distance between
evaluators and proposals (Table 2). Model (2) regresses the same model, but this time includes
research proposal dummies so as to wholly control for cross-proposal diﬀerences. Of course the
Novelty variable drops out. Crucially, the coeﬃcient on Distance is statistically unchanged. This
is notable given the radical re-speciﬁcation of the model with proposal dummies (as indicated by
the jump in adjusted-R2 statistic from .22 to .48). Models (3) and (4) repeats such a comparison,
but this time also including the interaction between Novelty  Distance. While the estimated
coeﬃcients on the interaction in both cases are insigniﬁcant, the point estimates are almost identical
with and without proposal dummies. And again, the estimated coeﬃcients on Distance remain
almost identical across these models. The close similarity of coeﬃcients with and without proposal
dummies provides added assurance our estimation approach in dealing with unobserved proposal
characteristics has been successful. This is fortunate, given this estimation challenge is an inherent
limitation that should aﬄict any study attempting to measure a novelty eﬀect.
<Table 6>
“Blind” Evaluations, i.e. cov (Xe r; ep) = 0. Important to our analysis is that evaluators
responded to the contents of research proposals, rather than to the identities of researchers behind
the proposals. The combination of a “triple-blind” process (Section 3.1), the emphasis in the
call on proposing new research (rather than potentially well-known existing work), the wide call
for participation and the wide set of evaluators, and the unorthodox format of the submissions
should have all served to obscure identities of researchers to a considerable degree. Fortunately,
we are able to explicitly test for eﬀects of relatedness between evaluators and researchers in these
data. We have 39 instances in which submitting researchers and the evaluators examining their
proposals were from the same hospital or organization within the broader university. We also have
11 cases in which submitting researchers and evaluators were coauthors in previous work. Models
(5) and (6) introduce indicators for same organization and coauthors, while model (7) introduces
them together. Consistent with the successful blinding process, coeﬃcients on these variables are
statistically indistinguishable from zero, while the coeﬃcient on Novelty is unchanged.
19The Novelty Measure. Another feature of the analysis deserving greater scrutiny is our main
explanatory variable, Novelty. The bulk of our discussion on this point appears in Section 4.1.
Beyond this, we might simply ask the question “How novel is novel?”. For example, should we
expect to see a discrete change as a research proposal moves from zero Novelty to non-zero levels of
Novelty? Might there be non-linear eﬀects? To assess these questions, we re-estimated our model.
Models (8) and (9) each feature a dummy to distinguish zero from non-zero levels of Novelty.
Model (8) further allows for a possible convex or concave relationship with Novelty in allowing for
an aﬃne relationship, including quadratic and linear terms. Model (9) is similar, except specifying
the relationship with Novelty as a ﬂexible, non-parametric relationship. The non-parametric partial
relationship between Score and Novelty of the model is reported in Figure 1. The results in both
models suggest no stark or qualitative departures from the linear model. Both models (8) and (9)
ﬁnd no discrete diﬀerence between zero and non-zero levels of Novelty and indicate the relationship
between Score and Novelty is slightly concave, becoming slightly more negative for higher levels of
Novelty.
<Figure 1>
Alternative Dependent Variables. Our basic assumption in our analysis is that our dependent
variable, the overall impact score (customary in evaluations), is the most relevant dimension of the
evaluation to focus on. At the same time, we should expect that patterns in relation to our other
measures of evaluators’ judgments, Feasibility and Allocation, should not yield fundamentally dif-
ferent patterns. To conﬁrm this supposition, models (10) and (11) in Table 6 replace the dependent
variable in our baseline model with these variables. We ﬁnd that replacing the dependent variable
in this way yields similar signs and signiﬁcant results; although, as should be expected, with lower
statistical signiﬁcance.
6.3 Magnitude of Eﬀects
We can use the model coeﬃcients to gain a better appreciation for how the novelty discount should
aﬀect outcomes. We begin with a simple illustration. The score drops -2.21 points (rated on
the 10-point scale) for every unit change of our Novelty measure. Therefore, for every standard
deviation of Novelty (standard deviation = .11), evaluators reduce the score by .24 points. If we ask
how such a systematic discounting would aﬀect the outcome of a given research proposal, consider
that a .24-point discount implies a .17 standard deviation drop in terms of the average scores of
proposals (standard deviation = 1.44). If we approximate the distribution of mean proposal scores
as Normal, this drop of .17 standard deviations relative to the mean implies a 7% drop in the
percentile. In the case of 150 proposals, this means a drop of 10.5 rank positions.9
9Another appreciation of magnitude of eﬀects can be achieved by re-regressing this model, but replacing the
dependent variable and Novelty with the log-transforms to allow the coeﬃcient on Novelty (-.58) to be interpreted
as an elasticity measure. Therefore, on average, for every 1% increase in novelty, the score drops .6%.
20A limitation of the above estimate of the impact on rank order is it is in relation to the mean
of the distribution–the “fattest” part of the distribution where a drop in score has the greater
impact on one’s rank. Estimating the average eﬀect would eﬀectively involve conducting the earlier
comparison, but doing so across the entire distribution to estimate the average eﬀect. At the same
time, we can improve our ability to assess the impact for individual proposals by moving from the
parameterized Normal estimate of the distribution, used above, to using the actual distribution
of scores. To simulate these outcomes, we eﬀectively recalculate the ranks of individual proposals
if their scores were to drop by .24 points. Results are summarized in Figure 2. The average
drop in rank over the entire sample would be -6.8 places or a 4.5 percentiles. These values are
sensibly slightly smaller than the estimates in the preceding paragraph where we calculated the
eﬀect in relation to the mean proposal. Apart from the population average eﬀects, we should also
be especially interested in the marginal eﬀect of novelty in the right tail–or the very best proposals.
For example, eight of the top ten proposals would drop at least one rank if they were one standard
deviation more novel. It should also be noted in regard to Figure 2 that the number of simulated
incidences with zero changes in rank is a minority of cases.
<Figures 2,3>
Apart from these marginal eﬀects, it is also informative to consider the infra-marginal eﬀects–or
what would have happened if novelty simply did not play a role at all in shaping evaluations. To
simulate this eﬀect, we adjust each of the received scores by their total eﬀect of novelty. Here we
subtract -2.21, multiplied by the particular value of Novelty for each proposal. Recall, we showed
earlier the eﬀect was linear over the entire domain of Novelty.) We then re-rank the proposals and
compare those ranks with the original, actually received ranks. As can be seen in Figure 3, the
eﬀects are large, with a standard deviation in change of rank of 6.4–implying that roughly a third of
the sample would experience a change in rank larger than this. (By deﬁnition, the average change
of rank over a list of ﬁxed size must be zero.)
6.4 Interpretation of Novelty Discount
Having shown a novelty discount, above, and established the robustness of the result, we turn to the
question of what mechanisms might be the reason for the novelty discount. Several explanations
can be set aside prior to proceeding to any analysis. For example, the measured eﬀect is not
caused by selection and sorting of novel proposals to certain types of evaluators; the randomization
procedure addressed this possibility (Section 3.4). The measured novelty discount is also not the
result of prejudicial administration of grants (ex: requiring pre-existing data, etc.). The format
of proposals was designed to avoid this possibility (Section 3.2). Nor was the discount caused by
some sort of prejudice against the authors of these research proposals or their relationships with
evaluators. Researcher identities were blinded (Sections 3.1 and 6.2). It is also not the case that
21novel proposals were simply of lower quality. This was the key point in our estimation strategy
and robustness checks (Section 6.1). In the following analysis, we consider how a range of possible
incentive and information eﬀects and perceptions of novel proposals might play a role.
Departures from Existing “Map of Science” or Departures from Evaluators’ Own Spe-
cialized Knowledge? To better triage possible explanations for the novelty discount, we ﬁrst test
whether novelty, a “departure” from the body of existing research, is any diﬀerent from a departure
from an evaluator’s own specialized knowledge. We are able to exploit varying proposal-evaluator
distance to explicitly estimate the eﬀect of distance from the evaluator, as distinct from novelty. As
a measure of Distance, we calculate the angular separation between vectors representing the MeSH
terms in a given proposal and counts of MeSH terms in the publication history of the evaluator,
generating a scale-free measure of the proximity that varies between zero and one. In order for
this value grow larger with distance, we deﬁne Distance, as one minus this angular separation.
Model (1) of Table 7 begins by reporting the earlier preferred baseline model (model 5 of Table 4)
to ease comparison. Model (2) introduces this Distance measure and model (3) does so while also
including dummies for individual research proposals. The coeﬃcient on Distance is positive and
signiﬁcant and statistically the same in these two models.10 This indicates that intellectual distance
is indeed an important factor shaping evaluation, and that evaluators tend to give more stringent
evaluations to research proposals that are closer to their own areas of expertise.11 Evaluators might
have some combination of both greater ability and greater incentives to evaluate proposals “close”
to them more stringently. More crucial to our interpretation of the novelty discount, introducing
this variable has no eﬀect on our estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty. This suggests that a research
proposal’s departure from the existing map of science has a distinct and separate eﬀect from the
question of being distant from an evaluator’s own area of deep specialized expertise.12
<Table 7>
Incentive Eﬀects: Strategic Incentives or Conﬂicts of Interests? While novel proposals
should by deﬁnition depart from existing research pathways, they might still serve as alternative or
substitute pathways to certain bodies of existing research. This could plausibly create incentives
10While the particular question of relatedness of an evaluator and the evaluated proposal is not the thrust of our
analysis and has been examined in earlier research, our estimate here is perhaps useful in several regards. It exploits
both dummy variables for the evaluator and for the proposal. It focuses on relatedness to the content of the proposal
(through blinding), rather than to the identity of the researcher. Our estimate is also based on relatedness to a “ﬁrst
phase” generation of an idea and research hypothesis, rather than for completing an entire proposal. Here we also
focus on an individual evaluator’s assessment, as the unit of observation, rather than discrete approval outcomes or
the overall evaluation of a group of evaluators.
11We also considered possible quadratic and indicator-based relationships with Distance. None of these alternative
speciﬁcations changes the estimated coeﬃcient on Novelty.
12We ﬁnd similar results when replacing the angular separation measure of distance to one that is algebraically
more similar to how we constructed the Novelty measure, whereby we measure the fraction of MeSH term pairs that
the given evaluator has not previously encountered.
22to alter evaluations among those evaluators most proximate and most likely to have a stake in the
outcomes of novel research. For example, a novel approach could plausibly represent a challenge
to existing research paths and compete for resources and attention. Alternatively, a novel research
proposal might somehow build interest in an existing research area and act as a complement to
existing proximate areas. To seek evidence that might be consistent with any sort of strategic or
incentive eﬀects, we test whether evaluators most proximate to novel research proposals respond to
novelty any diﬀerently than those who are more distant and therefore potentially more disinterested.
To do so, model (4) of Table 7 introduces an interaction term between Novelty and Distance
into the model. Given we are now interested in estimating the coeﬃcients on characteristics of
evaluator-proposal pairs, we continue to include both evaluator and proposal dummies in the model
to assure most precise estimates. (Consequently, all direct eﬀects in these and following interactions
need not be explicitly included.) The estimated coeﬃcient on Distance remains unchanged, but that
on the interaction term is not statistically distinguishable from zero. To further vet the possibility
that more proximate evaluators respond diﬀerently to novelty, model (5) introduces an interaction
of Novelty with an indicator for whether the evaluator conducts research in the endocrine-related
disease area; and model (6) interacts Novelty with a count of the number of the disease-related
publications of the evaluator. Neither interaction is found to be signiﬁcant. In model (7) we then
tested whether a more discrete measure of distance might better capture any strategic eﬀects. Here
we interacted Novelty with an indicator switched on when Distance is more than two standard
deviations below the mean of that variable (i.e, .72). Again, as reported in model (7), we ﬁnd no
indication of a signiﬁcant interaction term and therefore no evidence that more proximate evaluators
treat novelty any diﬀerently.
In ﬁnding no evidence that more proximate evaluators treat novelty diﬀerently, we fail to ﬁnd
any strong indication of strategic incentives or conﬂicts of interest playing a role in the discounting
of novelty. Further, these results more generally underline a qualitative diﬀerence between departing
from the “map” of (normal) science, and simply departing from one’s own area of expertise. While
intellectual “distance” from a proposal clearly shapes evaluations (consistent with earlier research),
we ﬁnd no evidence from these tests that more proximate evaluators treat novelty any diﬀerently.
Information Eﬀects: The Limits of Knowledge in Evaluating Novel Ideas? Having failed
to ﬁnd evidence consistent with the strategic incentives of evaluators playing a role in the novelty
discount, here we seek evidence of whether it might be inherently and unavoidably challenging to
assess the quality of novel ideas on the basis of existing knowledge–an information eﬀect of sorts
aﬀecting the evaluation of novelty. Certainly a relatively uniform discounting of novelty across the
population, as exhibited in earlier tests, provides evidence consistent with this possibility. However,
here we intend to implement more discriminating tests. We begin with the conjecture that if it is
diﬃcult to evaluate novel ideas, that there might still be certain individuals with at least incremen-
tally greater capabilities to perform these evaluations. In particular, it may be those who are both
23i) most proximate to the proposal and ii) with highest experience and knowledge.13 Therefore, we
go beyond the earlier two-way interactions between novelty and proximity and introduce an added
three-way interaction with measures of knowledge and experience. Thus, we eﬀectively ask whether
proximate evaluators of relatively high quality and experience treat novelty any diﬀerently. (Intro-
ducing three-way interactions, of course, we also introduce all constituent two-way interactions and
direct eﬀects not already dealt with by proposal dummies and evaluator dummies in the model.)
We investigate two diﬀerent measures of knowledge and experience. These are, ﬁrst, an indicator
for whether the faculty is senior and, second, the number of publications. We ﬁnd no evidence that
senior faculty, as a group, respond diﬀerently to novelty when they are close to the novel proposal,
as in model (8). However, we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant interactions where we measure knowledge and
experience in terms of numbers of publications, as in model (9).14 In this model (9), the negative
interaction between Distance and the number of publications indicate that more accomplished
evaluators tend to respond more negatively, in general, to more distant proposals than do less
accomplished evaluators.
As regards the interactions with Novelty, the negative interaction between Novelty and the
number of publications, it appears that more widely published evaluators are even more critical in
general of novel proposals than lesser published evaluators already are. It is diﬃcult, however, to
suggest that this comes from strategic incentives in the sense of a conﬂict of interest: the three-way
interaction in model (9) indicates it is precisely where proposals are proximate to most published
evaluators where they give a slight boost in the evaluation. The positive three-way interaction is by
no means a wholly discriminating test; however, it is consistent with more accomplished evaluators
having an incrementally greater ability to interpret novel proposals, and therefore being less inclined
to reﬂexively discount these particular proposals.
If novel proposals are indeed intrinsically diﬃcult to evaluate on account of their novelty and on
account of the bounded ability of researchers to draw on existing knowledge to evaluate new ideas,
one possibility is we might simply see greater variance and disagreement across evaluations in the
case of novel proposals. Greater variance or uncertainty might itself account for discounting, despite
no systematic diﬀerences in expected quality per se. To assess this possibility, we re-estimate our
model, but allow model variance to vary as a parametric function of Novelty, as we simultaneously
estimate the conditional mean. As reported in model (1) of Table 8, we ﬁnd no systematic rela-
tionship between model variance and Novelty; the coeﬃcient indicating the relationship between
model variance and Novelty is insigniﬁcant, small, and even nearly zero (while coeﬃcients in the
conditional mean part of the model remain roughly unchanged). To further probe this possibility,
13It is possible to develop counter hypotheses that those who are closest and most experienced are least able to
recognize useful novel solutions that depart from the orthodoxy. Most important here, we seek evidence of any
signiﬁcant patterns whatsoever.
14Given we are now introducing multiple interactions into the model, we assure the signs and signiﬁcance are
indeed meaningful, by dropping the three-way interaction to assure the two-way interactions retain their sign and
signiﬁcance.
24we re-specify our analysis altogether, to focus on (all proposals for) each proposal as the unit of
analysis (i.e., 150 proposal observations, rather than 2,130 evaluator-proposal observations). Model
(3) has as its dependent variable the range (i.e., max - min) of evaluator scores for each proposal,
Model (4) has as its dependent variable the standard deviation of all scores for each proposal. We
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationships with Novelty. Therefore, we ﬁnd no evidence of greater variance
or disagreement in scores with increased novelty. Therefore, we ﬁnd no evidence that novelty is
leading to a wider range of subjective assessments; only a uniform discounting of novel proposals.
<Table 8>
Another potential interpretation of discounting that could potentially account for the novelty
discount is a general expectation of greater risk, despite no inherent quality diﬀerences. To gain
greater insight into this possibility, we exploit evaluators’ own self-reported subjective Feasibility
scores. Model (1) of Table 9 begins by reporting our preferred baseline model to ease interpretation.
Model (2) adds this new variable Feasibility in attempts to “explain away” at least part of the nov-
elty discount. We ﬁnd that the overall evaluation is indeed related to Feasibility signiﬁcantly and
positively. More importantly, it explains 23% of the novelty discount (i.e., k( 2:21   1:70)=   2:21)k
). Therefore, while the formulation of these beliefs around feasibility might themselves be subjec-
tive, the response to these beliefs–a discount–would seem entirely appropriate. Given it appears
we have found an important eﬀect, we wish to better assure we have properly speciﬁed and cal-
ibrated it. We begin in model (3) with a most ﬂexible speciﬁcation of Feasibility as a series of
dummies for each integer value of the variable. We do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in ﬁt or the impact
on the Novelty coeﬃcient (i.e., how much of the novelty discount is explained). Therefore, this
test suggests we have explained as much of the novelty discount that can be explained with the
earlier linear model. In model (4), we attempt to assess whether it is the perception of feasibility or
some true underlying feasibility that individuals are responding to. We are limited in what we can
measure in this respect, however as a rough indication model (4) replaces each evaluator’s perceived
Feasibility measure with an average of this measure across all evaluators on a proposal, in case
this might approach something closer to an “objective” measure of feasibility. However, the ﬁt of
this model drops appreciably, as per the adjusted-R2 falling to .41 in model (4) from .56 in model
(2). Therefore, subjective feasibility scoring appears to play an important role above any absolute
or objective feasibility.
<Table 9>
7 Conclusions
In the paper we presented results and analysis from a medical research grant proposal process in
which we investigated how expert evaluators–elite researchers from a leading medical school–treated
25novel research proposals. We designed and implemented this study to “evaluate the evaluators”
by manipulating and altering features of the grant proposal process in order to derive relevant
inferences. The experimental design assured a blind process and that evaluators responded to the
content of the proposals rather than to the identity of submitting researchers. We also exploited
random assignment to assure any measured eﬀects were not related to selection and sorting of
research proposals viz. evaluators. We found a large, robust and relatively stable and uniform
novelty discount across a wide range of tests. A standard deviation increase in novelty, all else
being equal, led evaluators to provide a score that resulted in a roughly 4.5 percentile drop in
ranking, on average. The key estimation challenge in the analysis was to assure that unobserved
characteristics and quality of research proposals were not themselves the cause of the measured
discount. We conﬁrmed the relationship and underlying assumptions of the research design across
a wide range of robustness tests and diagnostics.
In additional testing, we found that novelty–a departure from existing science–shaped evaluator
scoring in qualitatively diﬀerent ways than did mere “distance” from the specialized expertise of an
evaluator. Whereas novel research proposals were relatively generally discounted, evaluators tended
to be more critical of proposals that were closer to their area of expertise–and these two eﬀects of
novelty and intellectual distance appeared to work largely independently of one another. Therefore
being “oﬀ the map of science” appears to have generally qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects on evaluators’
assessments than does simply being out of one’s depth.
We found evidence that the most accomplished (i.e., most published) of researchers tended to
discount novelty more heavily than the rest of the population, but discounted novelty slightly less
so when proposals were intellectually proximate to their own area of expertise. The results are
more easily interpreted as consistent with inherent information challenges in evaluating novel ideas
on the basis of existing knowledge than they are in terms of, say, a conﬂict of interest or strategic
incentives in the evaluation process. We could not ﬁnd evidence that novel proposals created
greater disagreement or subjective evaluations of their merit. Rather greater novelty simply led to
relatively uniform discounting. We see a novelty discount of similar magnitude across a range of
tests, subsamples, diﬀerent types of evaluators.
While we did not seek to (and are unable to) assess the productivity aspects of novelty, its
treatment may be consequential to the organization of peer evaluation. Fleming (2001) showed
that on average increasing novelty in the patent database yields lower success but higher variability
leading to a disproportionate share of breakthroughs. One interpretation of our ﬁnding is that peer
evaluators have internalized, within the normal science paradigm, the average eﬀects of novelty
and thus discount it uniformly, for potential concerns about the lower success rates. This appears
to be true, at least to some extent, as roughly a quarter of the discount related to subjective
evaluations of lower feasibility of novel proposals. However, this censoring of novel projects means
that the experiments never get a chance to be run and thus the beneﬁts of generating variance
and greater diversity of experiments are curtailed. This should be of concern to policy makers and
26society in general as precious research funds are being allocated more towards incremental research
as compared to high variability and potentially breakthrough eﬀorts. In the natural sciences, the
capital intensive nature of most laboratories means that the lack of funding for the initial grant
application almost certainly ensures that the scientists will all together drop that line of research
and steer themselves towards more normal science.
Bias in evaluations due to evaluators’ responses to the identity of researchers can be ﬁxed by
altering the process (insisting on double and triple blind evaluation) (Goldin and Rouse, 2000) or
creating incentives and systems for accurate information sharing (Li, 2012) or perhaps changing
the composition of evaluators. By contrast, it is more diﬃcult to imagine how an evaluator’s score
would not be impacted by the limits of their own knowledge and, more particularly, the bounds of
the established map of science. Indeed, the paradox exists because innovation requires novelty–but
novelty, as we have shown, is not appreciated and is in fact penalized. We speculate there might
possibly be remedies such as the introduction of new scoring metrics, the education of evaluators, the
use of algorithm based complementary scoring and possibly other approaches, which each deserve
deeper study. Further, and perhaps more profoundly, the question of what the optimal level of
novelty in the research portfolio remains an open question.
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 Linear versus Semi-Parametric Specifications of the Relationship Between Score and Novelty 
Notes. The graph presents the estimated partial relationship between Score and Novelty from our preferred baseline 
linear model, model (5) of Table (4), and an alternative flexible, semi-parametric estimate of this relationship. The 
semi-parametric model is estimated on a two-stage estimate, first estimating parametric coefficients and then 
separately estimating the non-parametric relationship with Novelty using locally-weighted regression methods 
(Yatchew 1998). 
 
 
Figure 2 Simulation of the Effect of a Standard 
Deviation Increase in Novelty for Each Research 
Proposal on Rank Outcomes 
 
Figure 3 Simulation of the Effect of Eliminating the 
Novelty Discount on Rank Outcomes 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Evaluator Characteristics 
 
Notes. Number of observations = 142 evaluators. 
 
 
Table 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
  
Notes. Number of observations = 2,130 research proposal-evaluator pairs, except for (7), (8), (9), (10) for 
which there are 689 research proposal-evaluator pairs.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
From Inside University 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00
Assistant Professor or Instructor .50 .50 .50 .50 .48 .50
Full Professor .50 .50 .50 .50 .52 .50
Female .40 .49 .30 .46 .48 .50
Year Birth 1962 11 1962 10 1958 13
Year Final Degree Awarded 1989 13 1990 10 1986 15
Publication Count 118 164 77 74 107 150
Ph.D. .62 .49 .52 .50 .37 .48
M.D. .74 .44 .65 .48 .74 .44
Disease-Domain 
Publications
Coauthor with 
Disease-Domain 
Publications
No Disease-Domain 
Publications
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Proposal Characteristics
(1) Score 5.7 2.6
(2) Novelty .16 .11 -.06
(3) MeSH Term Count 12.43 5.42 .15 .20
(4) Feasibility 5.23 2.56 .69 -.01 .15
(5) Points Allocation 6.67 9.17 .51 .00 .15 .49
(6) Word Count 1366 2489 .02 .10 .14 .06 .03
Researcher Characteristics
(7) Total Publications 9.13 24.01 .03 -.09 .23 .06 .07 .00
(8) Total Citations 99 521 .07 .04 .31 .10 .09 .05 .90
(9) Endocrine Publications .22 1.07 .07 -.07 .12 .12 .19 .05 .05 -.02
(10) Endocrine Citations 1.40 6.79 .06 -.02 .14 .11 .15 .03 .05 -.02 .86
(11) University Affiliation .47 .50 .13 -.02 -.09 .16 .14 -.12 .  . . .
Evaluator Covariates
(12) Total Publications 101 138 -.12 -.01 -.01 -.05 .00 .01 .00 -.01 .01 .00 -.01
Proposal-Evaluator Characteristics
(13) Distance .87 .07 .16 .14 .33 .15 .08 .03 .08 .14 .24 .18 -.03 -.28
(14) Coauthor .01 .07 .01 .02 .00 .00 .02 -.02 .17 .11 .11 .12 .08 .03 -.01
(15) Same Hospital .02 .13 .01 -.06 .00 .01 .02 -.01 .06 .02 -.03 -.01 .14 .01 -.04 .14  32 
Table 3 Variable Definitions 
  
Variable Description
Proposal Characteristics
Score Integer score between 1 and 10 response to the following question: "On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 
Lowest - 10 Highest) please assess the impact on T1D care, patients, or science of research 
that successfully addressed the questions or successfully followed the approaches proposed in 
the submissions."
Novelty Fraction of MeSH term dyads (from all possible combinations of terms associated with a 
given proposal) that are not observed in prior published research
MeSH Term Count Number of MeSH terms coded by expert to reflect the contents of the research propsal
Feasibility Integer score between 1 and 10 response to the following question: "On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 
Lowest – 10 Highest), please assess the likelihood that a research proposal could be executed 
based on this submission"
Points Allocation Integer score between 1 and 10 response to the following question: Imagine you had limited 
resources to fund the proposals.  Please allocate 100 points amongst all the proposals.  
Higher point allocations mean that you give a higher priority to that proposal being funded 
and developed."
Word Count The character count of the submitted research proposal, divided by 6
Individual Mesh Term 
Dummies
Among the 737 different MeSH terms in the proposals, this is a series of dummy variables for 
the 75 that appear in at least 5 research proposals; all other are captured with an "other" 
dummy
Researcher Characteristics
Total Publications Count of all prior publications listed in PubMed
Total Citations Count of the citations of all prior publications listed in PubMed
Endocrine Publications Count of all prior publications listed in PubMed related to the endocrine system disease area
Endocrine Citations Count of the citations of all prior publications listed in PubMed related to the endocrine 
system disease area
"Long List" of Proposal 
Quality Predictors
The four preceding variables, in addition to 23 other measures. Controls include: counts of 
endocrine publications; counts of endocrine publication citations; counts of total publications; 
counts of total publication citations; re-counts of the earlier four measures, based on just the 
past 3, 5, and 7 years; counts of publications divided by author position (first author, second 
author, last author, second last author, other position); counts of publications with MeSH 
terms as in the research proposal; counts of publication citations with MeSH terms as in the 
research proposal; counts of publications with MeSH terms as in the research proposal; counts 
of publication citations with MeSH terms as in the research proposal; counts “hit” 
publications based on achieving top citation percentiles within year of publication (including 
separate measures for 99th, 95th, 90th and 75th percentiles); counts of citations for most cited 
paper in endocrine publications; counts of citations for most cited paper in total publications; 
counts of citations for most cited paper in publications with at least one MeSH term as the 
research proposal.
University Affiliation Indicator variable switched to one for researchers from the host university
Evaluator Covariates
Total Publications Count of all prior publications listed in PubMed
Evaluator Block Dummies Evaluators were assigned to assigned randomly to 10 separate blocks of 15 randomly chosen 
research proposals; this is a series of 10 dummy variables corresponding to those randomized 
blocks
Proposal-Evaluator Characteristics
Distance Angular separation between the vectore representing the MeSH term coverage of the research 
proposal and the MeSH term coverage of the evaluator's publication history
Coauthors Indicator switched on if evaluator and submitting researcher have been coauthors in the past
Same Hospital Indicator switched on in cases in which the evaluator and submitting researcher are employed 
with the the same hospital or division within the university  33 
Table 4 Baseline Estimated Novelty Effect 
 
Notes. OLS estimates; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively; 
bootstrapped standard errors are reported; number of observations = 2,130 research proposal-evaluator pairs. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
Model: 1 2 3 4 5
Linear 
MeSH 
Count
Flexible 
MeSH 
Count
MeSH 
Term 
Dummies
Evaluator 
Block 
Dummies
Individual 
Evaluator 
Dummies
Research Proposal Characteristics
Novelty -2.38*** -2.35*** -2.3015*** -2.21*** -2.21***
(.53) (.48) (.50) (.61) (.51)
MeSH Term Count .083*** .081*** .081***
(.011) (.012) (.008)
MeSH Count Dummies Y Y
Individual MeSH Term Dummies Y
Evaluator Characteristics
Evaluator Block Dummies Y
Evaluator Dummies Y
Constant 5.04***
(.10)
Adj-R^2 .03 .07 .15 .03 .22
Score  34 
Table 5 Estimated Novelty Effect, Accounting for Unobserved Proposal Characteristics and Quality 
 
 
Notes. OLS estimates; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively; 
heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation  robust  standard  errors  are  reported;  Number  of  observations  =  689  proposal-
evaluator pairs and pertain only to submitting researchers from within the host university. 
   
Dependent Variable:
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Baseline 
Model
Related 
Pubs
Related 
Cites
Total 
Pubs
Total 
Cites
"Long" 
List of 
Controls
Proposal 
Word 
Count
Research Proposal Characteristics
Novelty -3.37*** -3.13*** -3.28*** -3.74*** -3.42*** -2.97** -3.35**
(.92) (.93) (.92) (.94) (.93) (1.49) (1.45)
MeSH Term Count .090*** .072*** .074*** .087*** .082*** .103*** .074*
(.016) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.037) (.043)
Number of Words .000
(.000)
Researcher Characteristics
Endocrine Publications .209***
(.062)
Endocrine Citations .025**
(.012)
Total Publications -.0063*
(.0030)
Total Citations -.0001
(.0000)
"Long" List of Proposal Quality Predictors
(1) Y Y
Evaluator Characteristics
Evaluator Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adj-R^2 .30 .30 .30 .30 .30 .40 .40
Score  35 
Table 6 Robustness 
 
Notes. OLS estimates; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively;  bootstrapped  standard  errors  are  reported;  number  of  observations  =  2,130  research 
proposal-evaluator pairs. 
Dependent Variable: Feasibility Allocation
Affine Semi-
Param.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Research Proposal Characteristics
Novelty -2.35*** -5.88 -2.21*** -2.18***-2.18*** 3.63** -.780* -3.19*
(.41) (5.64) (.49) (.49) (.49) (1.72) (.41) (1.66)
Novelty^2 -14.9***
(3.6)
I{Novelty > 0} .187 .340
(.27) (1.28)
MeSH Term Count .068*** .067*** .081*** .081*** .081*** .066*** .076*** .078*** .277***
(.01) (.01) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.043) (.01) (.05)
Research Proposal Dummies Y Y
Evaluator Characteristics
Evaluator Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Proposal-Evaluator Characteristics
Distance 3.44***3.71*** 3.00** 3.14**
(1.22) (1.20) (1.35) (1.35)
Novelty x Distance 4.06 5.02
(6.43) (5.94)
Coauthor .17 .05
(.738) (.759)
Same Hospital .45 .45
(.388) (.390)
Adj-R^2 .22 .48 .22 .48 .30 .30 .40 .30 .20 .17 .04
Alternative Dependent 
Variables
Response to Researcher 
Identity
With and Without Proposal 
Dummies
Score
See            
Figure 2  36 
Table 7 Interpretation of the Novelty Discount 
 
Notes. OLS estimates; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively;  bootstrapped  standard  errors  are  reported;  number  of  observations  =  2,130  research 
proposal-evaluator pairs. 
Dependent Variable:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline 
Novelty 
Model
Novelty vs. 
Distance
Distance
Research Proposal Characteristics
Novelty
(1) -2.21*** -2.35***
(.49) (.49)
MeSH Term Count .081*** .068***
(.01) (.01)
Proposal Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Evaluator Characteristics
Evaluator Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Proposal-Evaluator Characteristics
Distance 3.44*** 3.71*** 3.14** 3.62*** 3.71*** 3.76** 4.22* 3.83**
(1.31) (1.21) (1.40) (1.22) (1.21) (1.48) (2.33) (1.57)
Novelty x Distance 5.02 -2.36 -1.44
(5.72) (8.93) (6.31)
Novelty x T1D Researcher -1.13
(.82)
Novelty x No. Endocrine Pubs -.02
(.05)
I{Distance>.72} -.05
(.46)
I{Distance>.72} x Novelty .30
(3.06)
Senior x Distance -2.28
(2.43)
Senior x Novelty x Distance (17.0)
(10.4)
Pubs x Distance -.007*
(.004)
Pubs x Novelty -.057**
(.024)
Pubs x Novelty x Distance .067**
(.027)
Adj-R^2 .59 .30 .36 .23 .22 .24 .26 .36 .36
Score
How "Close" Proposals 
are Treated by Most 
Accomplished 
Evaluators
How "Close" Evaluators Treat Novelty  37 
 
 
Table 8 Novelty and Disagreement or Variance of Evaluations 
 
Notes. Models (1) and (2) estimated with maximum likelihood; model (3) estimated with OLS; *, 
**,  and  ***  indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  levels,  respectively; 
bootstrapped standard errors are reported. 
 
   
Dependent Variable: Range(Scores) Std.Dev.(Scores)
1 2 3 4
Unit of Analysis: Each Proposal Each Proposal
Parametric Mean
Novelty -2.19*** -.51 -.51
(.47) (1.14) (1.14)
MeSH Term Count .08*** .00 .00
(.01) (.02) (.02)
Research Proposal FE Y
Evaluator FE Y Y
Parametric Variance
Novelty .06 -.11 n/a n/a
(.32) (.36)
Constant 1.57*** 1.13 n/a n/a
(.06) (.07)
Number of Observations 2130 2130 150 150
Score
Each Evaluation of Each Proposal  38 
 
Table 9 Subjective Perceived Feasibility of Novel Proposals 
 
Notes. OLS estimates; *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively; bootstrapped standard errors are reported; number of observations = 2,130 
research proposal-evaluator pairs. 
Dependent Variable:
1 2 3 4
Baseline 
Preferred
Feasibility
Feasibility 
Dummies
Average 
Feasibility 
Score
Research Proposal Characteristics
Novelty
(1) -2.21*** -1.70*** -1.69*** -1.60***
(.49) (.37) (.37) (.43)
MeSH Term Count .081*** .031*** .031*** .020**
(.010) (.007) (.007) (.009)
Feasibility Score .65***
(.02)
Feasibilility Score Dummies Y
Average Feasibility Score .78***
(.03)
Evaluator Characteristics
Evaluator FE Y Y Y Y
Adj-R^2 .22 .56 .57 .41
Score